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Summary
Drawing on PISA 2012 data, in this paper we study the impact of school’s socio-economic composi-
tion on the science test scores for Spanish lower-secondary education students. We adopt a semi-para-
metric methodology that enables spillovers to affect all the parameters in the educational production
function. We also deal with the issue of endogenous students’ sorting into schools with better socio-
economic composition. The positive effect of school’s socio-economic composition is stronger when
computed using the semi-parametric approach, suggesting the relevance of slope effects of school com-
position. However, the spillovers are substantially reduced when the endogenous sorting of students is
controlled for.
Keywords: Educational attainments, school composition, PISA, Spain.
JEL Classification: I20, I21, I29.
1. Introduction
It is well known that parental socioeconomic background, especially schooling attain-
ments of the parents, represents the most important determinant of academic performance.
Parental education not only operates directly by fostering children’s schooling achieve-
ments, as there are several indirect channels through which parents’ education may intervene
in the schooling process of the next generations. One of these is the so-called school com-
position effect – i.e. the spillovers generated by school-average parental schooling or socioe-
conomic level–which appears to be one of the most important ‘school’ characteristics in de-
termining academic performance (Sacerdote, 2011). In fact, schools’ (or classrooms’)
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composition has been commonly considered as additional input of the education production
function (Hanushek, 2008).This paper quantifies school composition effects on Spain’s
lower-secondary schools (Educación Secundaria Obligatoria, ESO) using the Programme
for International Student Assessment (PISA) data from 2012 and, as such, is the first study
that has examined this issue forthe Spanish case.
Investigating the relevance of school composition in Spain is especially important be-
cause, when the number of applications for being admitted at a given school exceeds the num-
ber of available places (as is common in large cities), the admission process in public and pub-
lic-funded private schools (i.e. escuelas concertadas) is ruled by zoning laws and school
district policies (see Alegre et al., 2008; Robert, 2010). Therefore, given that the school ad-
mission criteria assigns the greatest weight to the proximity of the student’s home to the
school, these educational policies are inextricably linked to the effects of the schools’ socioe-
conomic mix. This means that the school admission process may result in the direct transfer
of the existing socioeconomic and ethnic residential segregation into the schools (Hoxby,
2003; Gorard et al., 2003). Moreover, school composition effects might have gained addition-
al relevance in Spain as a result of the significant increase in the number of immigrant stu-
dents from less affluent social backgrounds in recent years. They tend to reside within ethnic
enclaves (Bosch et al., 2011) and, as a consequence, their children are inevitably more likely
to be concentrated in schools characterised by a low socioeconomic composition. At the same
time, although legally prohibited, some public and public-funded private schools have been
using informal student selection criteria (Salinas and Santín, 2012). Therefore, analysing the
existence and the extent of school composition effects is crucial for addressing policies aimed
at reducing educational inequalities and their perpetuation across generations 1.
The existing contributions from economic literature have recognised many channels via
which the features of an individual’s schoolmates (or classmates) –namely, the peer effect–
might influence individual attainment. In the general framework proposed by Manski (1993;
2000), the overall effect of the peer group on individual outcomes primarily involves ele-
ments of social interaction that include both endogenous and contextual (or exogenous) ef-
fects. The former are the direct effects that peer behaviour or outcomes (i.e. test scores of
schooling performance) can have on individual outcomes; that is, students may well learn
more because their school/classmates learn more. The latter is the impact that certain exoge-
nous or predetermined characteristics of the peer group can have on a student’s achievement
–i.e. individual performance depends on the socioeconomic composition of his/her group. In
addition, the extent of peer effects might be confounded by the presence of shared environ-
mental/school elements or individual characteristics (e.g. cognitive and non-cognitive skills)
that go unobserved by the researcher; the so-called correlated effects. These correlated ef-
fects act as omitted relevant variables, as they are not captured by the econometric specifi-
cation of the educational production function, and might bias the coefficients of interest– in
our case, the impact of peer effects on academic achievement.
Obtaining separate estimates of endogenous and contextual effects is fraught with em-
pirical complications 2 and, moreover, is highly data-demanding. Thus, this study concerns
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itself solely with contextual effects, which has been a fairly common approach in the empir-
ical literature to date (Willms, 2010). More specifically, this paper uses a broad measure of
the socioeconomic composition of schools, based on the average parental educational back-
ground (defined as the highest educational level completed by either one of the two parents)
for each school. Its main contribution to the existing literature consists in the implementa-
tion of a semi-parametric methodology that allows school-contextual effects to influence all
parameters in the educational production function (as such, adapting the original proposal
made by Raymond and Roig, 2011). Standard analyses quantified the impact of school com-
position spillovers on academic achievement by a linear change in the intercept term (i.e. a
level effect). Nevertheless, contextual peer effects may also affect academic performance
through their impact on the coefficients of other variables included in the education produc-
tion function (i.e. a slope effect). This paper is aimed at capturing these additional effects of
socioeconomic composition and show that students of better endowed schools obtain a high-
er test score not only because of a change in the intercept of the education production func-
tion, but also because of the changes in the returns to other individual, family and school
characteristics that affect academic achievements 3.
Finally, this paper also seeks to deal with the most common problem encountered in the
estimation of school composition effects, namely the non-random selection of students into
different schools. This specific type of correlated effect might indeed bias the estimated ef-
fect of school-average parental education. In fact, the presence of a sorting mechanism that
allocates those students that are better endowed with unobserved characteristics into schools
with higher average parental education might generate a spurious spillover effect. Therefore,
we propose an alternative sorting mechanism that can be assumed to be unrelated to an in-
dividual student’s unobserved characteristics. Such reordering is based on the predicted lin-
ear score, obtained from an ordered probit model that estimates the probability of member-
ship in each quintile of the schools’ average parental education. This artificial sorting is then
used to reduce this specific kind of selection bias in the estimates of school composition ef-
fects. Thus, this study was able to provide a measure of a school’s composition effect that
should arguably be less affected by correlated effects.
With these purposes in mind, the rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2
contains a brief review of selected papers examining peer effects, focusing on the various es-
timation strategies adopted to eliminate correlated effects. Section 3 describes the empirical
methodology that was used in this study and Section 4 is dedicated to a description of the
data. Section 5 contains the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2. Selected Contributions
Previous studies from the economic literature about peer effects on scholastic achieve-
ment present quite mixed findings and, to date, there is no unified evidence as to the exis-
tence or to the actual form that these effects might take 4. This line of research has sought to
capture these potential spillovers at several points in the educational process (from primary
59School Composition Effects in Spain: Accounting for Intercept and Slope Effects
to tertiary stages), and by considering different peer features (actual or lagged peers’ test
scores, ethnic and socioeconomic composition of the peer group, etc.). This points to the fact
that the resulting externalities could be either positive or negative (or even zero), while de-
pendent at all times on the nature of the peer variables, and as such the final net effects be-
come an empirical question. Furthermore, governed primarily by data availability, the defi-
nition of these peer groups has been markedly heterogeneous, ranging from school,
school-by-grade and classroom to other social peers such as roommates or friends. As a re-
sult, the findings tend to be highly case-specific and not always strictly comparable. In gen-
eral, this lack of explicit comparability is attributable to: (i) the specific characteristics of the
sample used; and (ii) the (subsequent) econometric technique adopted for identifying peer
effects other than the correlated effects.
Interestingly, some studies are based on special samples in which students are assigned
randomly into peer groups, thereby possibly eliminating the bias attributable to correlated ef-
fects. More specifically, such quasi-experimental studies exploit the randomised trials gen-
erated by the chance matching of students with first-year roommates in college accommoda-
tion (see, among others, Sacerdote, 2001; Foster, 2006; Brunello, De Paola and Scoppa,
2010), changes in student distribution criteria (Hoxby and Weingrath, 2006) or class assign-
ment on the basis of surname during first-year university courses (De Paola and Scoppa,
2010). Albeit randomised trials based evidence appear to be the most convincing in terms of
internal validity, these experiences are relatively scarce and some authors pointed out the
lack of external validity of such estimates because of the peculiarity of the samples used (and
the different realities they reflect). Therefore, alternative strategies to reduce the selection
bias have been developed. For example, several other papers, such as Hanushek et al. (2003)
or Lavy et al. (2011), adopt fixed effect frameworks in order to control for any potential bias
in peer effect estimates.
The present study is most closely related to those undertaken by Fertig (2003),
Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer (2007) and Rangvid (2007), which also drew on PISA data.
Fertig (2003) investigated the effect of reading achievement heterogeneity in US schools ap-
plying an Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation 5, which indicates that attending a hetero-
geneous school in terms of student achievement undermines individual performance.
Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer (2007) explored the effect of socioeconomic composi-
tion at the school-by-grade level in Austria. They argue that, when accounting for school
type, –given the marked track system in Austrian lower and upper-secondary schools–
school-fixed effects reduce the selection bias in the estimation of peer effects. Their results
highlight a significant asymmetry in the peer effects on reading 6, which seems to have a
more beneficial effect in the case of students of a low socioeconomic background. Moreover,
their findings are buttressed by the results they also obtained using a quantile regression
strategy.
Rangvid (2007) analysed the effect of the socioeconomic composition of a school in
terms of the three PISA subjects (reading, maths and science) drawing on Danish data,
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which were complemented with administrative registers to overcome the potential prob-
lems caused by the limited sampling of students within each school 7. The author cannot
rely on the school-fixed effect estimation as was the case in Schneeweis and Winter-
Ebmer (2007), because assuming that individuals (and their families) who are placed in
a given school of a certain track share similar unobserved characteristics is unlikely to be
valid in the Danish context, due to the comprehensive nature of the Danish secondary
school education system 8. Her identification strategy was instead based on controlling for
a large set of individual, family and school variables, without explicitly considering the
role of selection on unobservable features. The results in this study suggest a clear posi-
tive effect of attending a school with a higher socioeconomic composition in the middle
of the test-score distribution, whereas no significant effect is found for the socioeconom-
ic heterogeneity at the school level. Moreover, the quantile estimation reveals that school
composition effects vary among the competences assessed and the ability level of stu-
dents. It is worth mentioning that Ding and Lehrer (2007) and Carman and Zhang (2012)
obtained opposite results, using Chinese panel data, highlighting that: (a) peer effects are
heterogeneous; and (b) the exact shape of peer effects remains undetermined (as also Sac-
erdote, 2011 points out).
Finally, some recent studies have dealt with this issue for the Spanish case. On the one
hand, Mora and Oreopoulos (2011) analysed peer effects for one of the Spanish regions, Cat-
alonia, using information which allowed them to distinguish reciprocating from non-recip-
rocating friends inside a class. On the other hand, Crespo-Cebada et al. (2014) compared the
efficiency of public and private government-dependent Spanish secondary education schools
using PISA 2006 data. Their non-parametric strategy was preceded by a propensity score
matching approach in order to tackle the selection bias. In this study, as in ours, the extent
to which this bias is reduced depends on the variables introduced in the analysis for explain-
ing school selection processes in Spain –by schools and by families.
3. Empirical Framework
The estimation strategy proposed in this paper represents a step forward in terms of the
measurement of peer effects. Indeed, the main innovation with respect to previous studies
consists, as briefly commented in the introduction, in the idea that the spillovers produced
by an improvement in a school’s socioeconomic composition may affect not only the inter-
cept, but all the parameters of the educational production function. On the contrary, the ex-
isting evidence relies on linear-in-mean models, which only consider the level changes in the
predicted test score generated by school composition.This original proposal has been taken
(and adapted) from the paper by Raymond and Roig (2011), in which they estimate the ex-
ternality produced by the average human capital of workers in the same firm 9. In keeping
with the externality produced by schools’ socioeconomic composition, our empirical strate-
gy took as its starting point the standard educational production function,
T X' 'i s, =α βs + +i δ Zs + εi,s , (1)
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where test score T of student i s
i,s 
in school depends on a set of individual and family char-
acteristics (X
i
) as well as on a set of school characteristics (Z
s
), plus a composite error term
(ε
i,s
). Usually, exogenous/contextual peer effects are simply estimated by considering that
the intercept term (α
s
) is not fixed, but instead dependent on a certain average characteristic
of the peer group 10–in this case, the average parental education of students in each school s
––
(PEs). This means that the intercept term in (1) could be rewritten as,
which indicated that a unit increase in the average parental education in the school modified
the mean test score by µ points, through a shift in the intercept term. We could also adopt a
non-linear specification, where the impact of the school’s composition in terms of parental
schooling is allowed to vary for each successive quintile of school-average parental educa-
––
tion (Q
j
(PEs), j=1,...,5). In this case, the intercept term in (1) couldbe expressed as,
α α
s
s = + ⋅µ P( )E (1a)
5
α αs j= + ⋅∑α s1 Q Pj ( )E (1b)
j=2
where the contextual peer effects were now α
j
(j=1,..,5) and allowed to be different for each quin-
––
tile of average parental education (Q
j
(PEs)). Even in this case, the impact of the peer group’s
characteristics was only produced by a level effect, which operated through a modification
of the educational production function’s intercept. In fact, once the expression (1b) was sub-
stituted into equation (1) we obtained,
s
T Q∑5=α α+ ⋅ ( )PE + β ' 'i s, 1 j j Xi s+δ Z + εi,s (2)
j=2
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This corresponded to the standard equation used in the peer effects literature, except for
the non-linear specification of the contextual peer effects.
Equation (2) clearly specified that the standard approach constrained school composi-
tion spillovers so as to affect only the intercept term and no other parameter in the educa-
tional production function (even allowing for a non-linear effect). However, there is no the-
oretical reason to believe that the contextual peer effects consist only of a simple level effect.
For example, an improvement in the socioeconomic composition of the peer group might
modify the effect of students’ family background and home environment on their test score
(i.e. the β coefficients). Additionally, belonging to a ‘good’ peer group in terms of average
parental human capital might either relax or reinforce the relationship between other school
characteristics and an individual’s achievements (i.e. the δ coefficients).
In order to capture any potential shape effect of school composition, we firstly consid-
ered a reference group, which consisted of all the students who belonged to the least-advan-
taged schools in terms of average parental educational background. In the present applica-
tion, the least-advantaged schools weredefined as those schools that appeared in the first
–– ––quintile of the average parental education 11 (i.e. (Q (PEs)=(Q
j 1(PE
s)). Therefore, the educa-
tional production function was separately estimated for the reference category, including in-
dividual (X
i
) and school (Z
s
) characteristics of the least-advantaged group, plus an error term
(e ). Defining as W the matrix of individual and school controls (i.e. W = (1, X , Z
i,s, i i i s
)), the
estimation of this model allowed us to obtain the estimates of the educational production
function’s parameters for this specific group of students, specifically
where the subscript ‘1’ indicated that the coefficient j^’ have been estimated only for indi-
––viduals belonging to the first quintile of school-average parental education (Q1( PE
s)). We
then proceeded to forecast the test score (T
is
) for all the individuals who did not belong to
the reference group (i.e. j >1), using the estimated parameters from eq. (3), that is,
 s  
( (T Q )) ', PE α β X δ 'i s 1 = +1 1 i s+ 1Z + εi,s = ϕ  s s' (1W 3)i i+ ε ,s  if  Qj ( )PE =Q1( )PE
  s  
( (T Q, PE );   ) ' 'i s 1 ϕ α1 1= + β1Xi s+ δ1Z ∀ s i∈Qj (PE ),  j > 1 (4)
Finally, for each successive quintile j of the school-average parental education, we de-
fined the measure of school composition spillovers (IEX
j
) as the average difference between
––the actual (T
is
) and the forecasted test score ( ^T ∣Q
i,s j
(PEs); j^
1
) within each quintile (each
composed of n
j
observations):
∑ N s j T T– ( Q (PE ; )IEX i= i s, ,i s j ) ϕj = ∀1 1 s  i Q∈ ( )
n
j ( )PE j,  > 1 5
j
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In words, this measure of contextual peer effects (IEX
j
) was based on counter factual ev-
idence, which is defined as the ceteris paribus within-quintile average differential between
the observed and the predicted test score, where the latter is obtained by using the parame-
ters estimated for students in the least-advantaged schools. More intuitively, this methodol-
ogy represented a semi-parametric approach to capture the ceteris paribus changes in the test
score, produced by moving a representative student from the first quintile to successive quin-
tiles of the school-average parental education. Note that this measure of the effects of school
composition captured in a semi-parametric way the change in each parameter making up the
whole educational production function (i.e. it captured both level and slope effects), pro-
duced by incrementing average parental schooling from the first to the higher quintiles.
Under the assumption of a correct specification of the educational production function 12
[eq. (3)], this approach would provide more compelling and complete evidence about the ef-
fect of school’s composition on individual test scores –obtained without constraining these
potential spillovers of the peer group’s socioeconomic background to operate only through
a shift in the intercept term.
3.1. School Composition and Selection Bias
The semi-parametric methodology proposed in the last section is not, however, exempt
from the most relevant empirical problem in the estimation of contextual peer effects, rep-
resented by the self-selection of students into schools and peer groups (i.e. a specific kind
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of correlated effect). In this paper we seek to reduce the bias produced by the sorting mech­
anism that allocates those students with a greater (lesser) endowment of unobserved abili­
ties into better (worse) peer groups, which may bias our measure of school composition ef­
fects. Indeed, was this to be the case, the forecasted test score for non-reference group 
students from eq. (3) would present a downward bias, pointing to an overestimation of the 
effects of school composition. In other words, even if we tried to account for selection on 
observable variables by conditioning for a large set of individual and school controls (sim­
ilar to Rangvid, 2007, see Section 4), we would not be particularly confident about the con­
ditional zero mean of the error term in the test-score equation estimated for the reference 
group (eq. 3). 
In line once more with Raymond and Roig (2011), rather than using a classification of 
reference and non-reference groups based on actual school-average parental education, we 
allocated students to reference and non-reference groups on the basis of the predicted linear 
score obtained from an ordered probit model. This ordered probit model estimated the prob­
ability of membership in each of the five quintiles of the average parental education at school 
level, as a function of variables that predicts average parental schooling and are (presum­
ably) conditionally unrelated to students’ unobserved abilities (i.e. the error term of the ed­
ucation production function). Specifically, from the ordered probit estimates we computed 
the predicted linear score that represents a proxy of the (latent) parental schooling in each 
school, obtained from the following equation: 
⇒  PE s * = γ ' R + μ PE s * = γ ' R (6)i i i i i 
–– In equation 6, school-average parental education (PE s*) depends of a set of variablesi 
(Ri) and an error term (µi). Subsequently, the observations were sorted according to the quin­
tiles of the predicted linear score (γ~’Ri). This proxy of the schoolmates’ parental human cap­
ital would be correlated to the school-average parental education, but at the same time it 
might be considered as independent of students’ unobserved abilities. Therefore, we took as 
the reference group those students in the first quintile of the predicted parental schooling and 
we estimated the test-score equation (eq. 7) for this subsample: 
(T Q* (γ′R )) = α1 + β ′ X +δ ′ Z + εi =ϕ1 ′W + ε if Q* (γ′R ) = Q* (γ′R ) (7)is 1 i 1 i 1 s ,s i i,s j i 1 i 
It was then possible to re-compute the index of school composition spillovers (IEX* j) in 
the same fashion as above, but now without such a marked effect from the self-selection of 
students into peer groups, as students in eq. (8) were assigned to the j quintiles by the pre­
–– ~ dicted (school-average) parental schooling PE s* instead of the observed average parentali –– schooling in each school (PEs, see eq. 5 above), 
∑N j T – (T Q* (γ′R );ϕ ) *i s, i s, j i 1* i=1IEX = ∀ i Q∈ * γ ′W ) = Q P  E s ), j > (8)(  ( 1j * j i j i 
nj 
* ~being nj the number of observations in each quintile of the predicted linear score γ’ Wi. 
As mentioned before, sorting students according to the predicted school-average
parental schooling instead of using the observed variable would clean (at least in part) the
measure of school composition spillovers from correlated peer effects –i.e. students enrolled
in better schools in terms of parental education would share higher unobserved abilities–
only in the case the right-hand-side variables in eq. (6) actually produce some (conditional-
ly) exogenous variation in predicted parental schooling. Finding such ‘exclusion restric-
tions’(borrowing from IV terminology) is always a challenge in studies based on observa-
tional data.
In this work, apart from the same individual and school controls included in the original
educational production function, the vector R
i 
in eq. (6) contained a set of dummies for
school availability (one and more than one school’s available respectively –relative to no
other school available), as well as dummies for municipality size. Additionally, we included
the average years of schooling of the adult population by region and municipality size for
2008, which would approximate the schooling endowment of ‘potential parents’ of students
in our sample. The information that we used to construct this last variable was taken from
the nationally-representative Spanish ‘2008 Survey of Household Budget’, carried out by the
Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE). We took the data from 2008, given that this
would represent the year of access to lower-secondary education for most of the students in
our sample. We then matched the computed average of adult schooling by region and mu-
nicipality size (only cities and big cities against smaller agglomerations) to the 2012 PISA
data.
These variables are significant predictors of the likelihood of being in a school with a
certain socioeconomic composition (as we show below). Moreover, we considered that the
~resulting linear index (g’ R
i
) constituted a proxy of school-average parental schooling that is
unrelated to students’ unobserved abilities–which represent the main confounding factor in
the school composition effect captured by eq. (5). This is because, once controlling for
parental education, socioeconomic status, other family characteristics and the large set of
school controls in the test-score equation (see the next section for details), we can reason-
ably assume that the only channel through which school availability, municipality size and
the local schooling endowment of the adult population in 2008 might affect a student’s test
score is via their effect on school selection (i.e. they are independent of unobserved student
characteristics). If this is true, eq. (7) is correctly estimated and the measure of socioeconom-
ic school composition obtained from (8) is now presumably ‘cleaned’ by the potential en-
dogenous selection of students into schools. In order to ‘informally’ gauge the validity of this
statement, we tried to perform a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation 13 considering
school-average parental education to be an endogenous variable, to be instrumented using
the above-variables. Therefore, we tested for over identification (Hansen J-test) and the ob-
tained evidence was in favour of our assumption, since we did not reject the null hypothesis
of conditional orthogonality between the considered variables and the test-score residual.
The estimated school composition effect from the linear IV was also in line with the aver-
age results from our methodological proposal, supporting again the validity of our results.
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However, it also seems worth noting that the composite error term in eq. (1) may assume
the general form ε = η + ν + ς
i,s i s i,s
, which means that apart from individual unobserved abil-
ity (η
i
), unobserved school characteristics (ν
s
) may also cause some bias in the results. How-
ever, we are not able to deal explicitly with this problem using the PISA database. We are
therefore forced to assume that the correlated school effects are zero once conditioned by a
school’s characteristics and regional fixed effects, at least in the case of the reference group.
It should be borne in mind that, should this assumption prove invalid, the results presented
in what follows may still be affected by the presence of some unobserved correlated school
effect. Of course, the extent to which this last statement is true depends on the predictive
power of the individual and school introduced both in equations 5 and 7 and their capacity
to minimise the impact of unobserved school characteristics that are likely to correlate with
average parental schooling. Nevertheless, given the data available for Spain, the alternative
approaches that could be applied to reduce this potential source of bias (such as the one sug-
gested by Crespo et al., 2014) would still rely on non-trivial assumptions (e.g. selection-on-
observables for propensity score matching).
We therefore acknowledge that, although the application of the methodology suggested
by Raymond and Roig (2011) has the potential to reduce the existing bias due to endogenous
students sorting –and, consequently, would allow us to provide more realistic estimations of
the magnitude of school composition effects– we cannot fully exclude the possibility that
some residual bias (or other simultaneous confounding factors) could still be affecting our
results. If this was the case, the resulting estimates of socioeconomic school composition ef-
fects would represent an upper bound, since it could be argued that students endowed with-
higher unobserved ability would be more likely to enrol in schools with better (unobserved
or unobservable) characteristics. Ruling out this possibility will be the objective of future re-
search, when more detailed and adequate data will be available for Spain.
4. Data description
As discussed above, the empirical analysis is based on Spanish data from the 2012 PISA,
undertaken by the OECD (see OECD, 2012, for details). The PISA focuses on the acquisi-
tion of skills among a target population of students aged 15 to 16. The 2012 assessment was
specifically concerned with the testing of mathematics skills and as such is the only skill con-
sidered in this study 14. In the specific case of Spain, the students interviewed were drawn
from a cohort of individuals enrolled in lower-secondary schools (Educación Secundaria
Obligatoria, ESO) during the survey year. As outlined earlier, Spanish lower-secondary ed-
ucation is completely comprehensive and compulsory until the age of 16. Normally, 15-year-
old pupils will be enrolled in the 4th grade of lower-secondary education; however, the sam-
ple contains students from lower grades as well (3rd, 2nd and 1st grade), representing those
who have repeated one or more grades. The original Spanish sample comprised 25,313 stu-
dents enrolled at 902 different schools 15. In order to take into account the specific statistical
properties of the PISA sample, all the statistics and estimations that we present in this study
have been carried out (applying individual and replication weights) using the STATA rou-
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tine ‘pv’, specifically designed for PISA and similar surveys (see Lauzon, 2004; Macdonald,
2008 for additional details).
The empirical analysis has been conditioned to the information drawn from a large sub-
set of relevant questions so as to limit the role of the unobservable variables (following
Rangvid, 2007 and the OLS specification of Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer, 2007, given the
available variables). The whole set of control variables are reported in table 1, together with
the exact definition of each variable, its mean and standard deviation. In summary, the con-
ditioning variables were divided into individual controls (sex, grade attended, age, migration
status and the language spoken at home), family controls (paternal and maternal education,
family socioeconomic status, maternal working situation, number of books at home and ed-
ucational resources), school controls (prevalence of immigrants, girls and part-time teachers,
lack of qualified teachers, school autonomy, student/teacher ratio, school size, school own-
ership, streaming processes, and presence of computers for instruction) and regional fixed
effects (capturing unobserved school and other contextual characteristics that are constant
within each region).
As usual, we also generated indicator functions for observations with missing informa-
tion for the explanatory variables, which were included in the regression model(s) in order
to control for the non-randomness of the missing values. In the case of missing information,
the explanatory variables were fixed as being equal to zero for discrete variables and equal
to the sample average in the case of continuous variables. As a measure of the socioeconom-
ic composition of the school we considered the school-average parental education, taking the
highest educational level completed by one or other of the two parents 16. Observations with
missing information about the highest parental education were discarded from the sample
(1.96% of the total sample). Since our school composition measure consisted of school-av-
erage values, we also discarded the observations of students that are enrolled in schools with
fewer than eight students. In the end, the sample used in the empirical analysis was formed
by 24,741 students at 881 different schools.
5. Results
5.1. Level Effects of School Composition
The starting point for this empirical analysis consisted in the estimation of the educa-
tional production function as described by eq. (2), in which the school composition measure
was allowed to be non-linear (dummies for school-average parental education quintiles), but
constrained so as to produce only a level effect. As reported in table 2, the results indicate
that moving from the first quintile to the second quintile of average parental schooling does
not produce any significant improvement in the mathematics test score (3 points with an as-
sociated t-Statistic of 0.888). However, the ceteris paribus comparison between students in
the first quintile and those in the third reveals that students in the latter group performed sig-
nificantly better than the reference group, showing a positive score gap of about 9.1 points.
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This positive level effect of school composition is just slightly higher when moving to the
fourth quintile (10 points). Finally, the test score for students in the most advantaged group
in terms of school composition (fifth quintile) is, on average, 19.2 points higher than the
score for students in the least-advantaged group. This means that an improvement in the
school’s socioeconomic composition had a substantial level effect on individual test scores,
and that this appears to be non-linear in the quintiles of average parental human capital at
school level.
Table 2
Eq. (2) ESTImATIon RESuLTS
Plausible 
Dependent variable: 
Values for the Mathematics Test Score Coefficient t-Statistic 
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Table 2 (Continued)
Eq. (2) ESTImATIon RESuLTS
Plausible 
Dependent variable: 
Values for the Mathematics Test Score Coefficient t-Statistic 
lack qualified teachers 3.146 0.54
school size 0– .007 –1.491
student/teacher ratio 0.857 1.407
budget autonomy 5.117 1.787
teacher hiring autonomy 5.88 1.058
textbook autonomy 7.257 1.185
course content autonomy 2– .295 –0.661
course offer autonomy 1– .343 –0.415
regional d ummies Yes
R-squared 0.44
# observations 24,741
Plausible Values Regression for PISA data; dummies for missing values included (not shown).
Results computed with the final student weights.
The estimates for the remaining control variables were of independent interest, and
it is worth briefly commenting on the main findings. The increase in student age is not
associated with the test score, whereas females seem to obtain worse results than males
in mathematics. The effect of the grade attended was as expected, given that students
from lower grades than that of the 4th grade (the standard grade at ages 15 and 16) per-
formed significantly worse. Even accounting for the language spoken at home and other
family characteristics, first-generation immigrant students performed significantly
worse than natives and second-generation immigrants (negative gap of 8.2 points). An
improvement in a family’s socioeconomic status had a positive effect on the mathemat-
ics test score, while only the father’s education showed a significant and positive effect
on a student’s competence for mathematics. In addition, the number of books and a
home’s endowment of educational resources also had a significant positive effect on the
test score.
An analysis of school control variables revealed the usual results for PISA data –i.e.
school characteristic control variables are hardly significant when explaining students’ test
scores. Therefore, we shall only describe in brief the few variables that displayed statisti-
cally significant coefficients. We detected a negative effect of the percentage of girls at-
tending a school on performance in maths. After accounting for family characteristics,
school’s socioeconomic composition and other school characteristics, we found that the
differences in performance between public and private and public-funded private schools-
disappeared. Finally, students enrolled at schools that disposed of budget autonomy
seemed to achieve better results than their counterparts. The evidence obtained from the
regional control variables indicated (not shown here) suggested that Castilla y León, La
Rioja, Navarra, Aragón and Madrid performed significantly better than the rest of Spain’s
regions.
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5.2. Accounting for Shape Effects and for Selection Bias
The results obtained from the estimation of eq. (2) suggested a significant and positive
effect of the school’s socioeconomic composition. However, as previously highlighted, this
result may merely represent partial or incomplete evidence, given that we implicitly con-
strained the impact of the school-average parental education so as to affect only average at-
tainments (i.e. the intercept of the educational production function). In order to capture any
other potential slope effect produced by an improvement in the school endowment of parental
human capital, we implemented the innovative methodology described above in Section 3 17.
Panel A of table 3 contains the estimated value of our measure of school composition
spillovers (eq. 5). We computed IEX
j
separately for each quintile of the school-average
parental education and we also calculated the average value for all the quintiles (except that
of the first quintile, which is the reference category). The results from the semi-parametric
methodology confirmed that the effect of the parental education of the peer group was sub-
stantial and clearly non-linear. As in the previous case, moving from the least-advantaged
group to the second and third quintiles of the school’s socioeconomic composition had vir-
tually no effect on individual test scores (about 1.6 points and 5.3 points, respectively, and
not statistically different from zero). However, the movement to higher quintiles generated
positive slope effects, which were hidden by the implicit constrains of eq. (2). Indeed, school
composition effects could be quantified into 7.7 additional test score points for students in
the fourth quintile of the average parental schooling, and up to 15.6 points for students in the
highest quintile. Additionally, the mean value for all the non-reference groups was also sta-
tistically significant, approaching 7 test score points.
Table 3
SCHooL CompoSITIon SpILLovERS (LEvEL+SHApE EFFECTS)
panel A
School Composition Spillovers - Baseline (eq. 5)
School-Average parental Education IEX
j
t-Statistic
quintile 1 Reference category
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0.599
1.484
1.793
quintile 5 15.642 4.327
mean 6.933 3.895
panel B
School Composition Spillovers - Self-Selection Corrected (eq. 8)
School-Average parental Education *IEX
j
t-Statistic
quintile 1 Reference category
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0.962
2.626
2.722
quintile 5 9.013 2.822
mean 5.819 3.507
Note: the test score equations for the reference groups contain the same control variables as those included in table 2
and have been estimated with the STATA command “pv”, which means the characteristics of the PISA sample can be
taken into account, see Section 4. Results computed with the final student weight.
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However, these results may well be biased by the fact that students with a better endow-
ment of unobserved abilities are more likely to enrol in better schools (in terms, that is, of their
socioeconomic composition). In order to reduce this potential selection bias, we first estimat-
ed eq. (6) using an ordered probit model explaining the probability of being in each of the five
quintiles of the actual school-average parental education. The estimates (table 4 18) indicate
that, conditional on municipality size, the likelihood of being in better schools is higher for
those who reside closer to other schools. Keeping fixed school availability and average years
of schooling in the region, the size of the municipality appeared to be relevant. Finally, the in-
crease of the average schooling endowment of adult population in the geographical area or
residence (region and municipality size) in 2008 –which represented the starting year of
lower-secondary school for most of the pupils in the sample– made being in a school with a
more favourable socioeconomic composition more likely. In general, the variables included
in the ordered probit model provided a satisfactory prediction of the probability of being in
each of the quintiles of the school-average parental education. Subsequently, we used the pre-
~dicted linear score (g’Ri) as a proxy for the school-average parental human capital that was
considered to be independent of the students’ unobserved characteristics.
Table 4
oRDERED pRoBIT ESTImATIon RESuLTS (Eq. 6)
Dependent variable: 5 quintiles of the 
school-average parental education Coefficient z-Statistic 
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When students were sorted into reference and non-reference groups according to the
predicted linear score, the evidence concerning school composition spillovers were
markedly different. As reported in the lower panel (B) of table 3, the average effect for
the upper quintiles is reduced, while it increases for the lower (relative to the results re-
ported in the upper panel of the same table), which is the result of a significant endoge-
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Figure 1. School composition spillovers with and without self-selection correction
nous sorting of more able students into schools characterised by a more favourable so-
cioeconomic composition (the same information is depicted in figure 1). More specifical-
ly, also accounting for endogenous selection, students from the third quintile of the prox-
ied average parental education performed better than pupils at the least-advantaged
schools (i.e. the reference group). The results regarding students in the third and in the
fourth quintiles of school-average parental education appeared to be unaffected by corre-
lated school composition effects (i.e. were virtually the same when endogenous selection
wastaken into account). However, when the selective sorting of pupils into schools was
accounted for, the effect of school composition was strongly reduced for students en-
rolled in the better endowed schools. Indeed, the value of our index of school composi-
tion effect for students in the fifth quintile fell from 15.6 to about 9.0 test score points
(relative to students enrolled in schools placed in the first quintile). This evidence sug-
gests that, especially for students in the highest quintile of average parental schooling,
there was a considerable sorting process in their favour with respect to less-advantaged
students. Summing up, a significant contextual peer effect was still detected even when
controlling for the endogenous sorting of more able students into schools characterised
by better socioeconomic composition, but it decreased for students enrolled in schools
placed in the highest quintile of the school-average of parental education. Indeed, among
these groups of students, the process of student sorting would seem to be nearly as im-
portant as the externality produced by the socioeconomic origins of an individual’s
schoolmates.
The above mentioned results have policy implications, as they provide evidence about
the existence of a ‘triple jeopardy’ hypothesis (Willms, 2010) linked to socioeconomic sta-
tus: first, the direct negative impact of a low family socioeconomic level on academic per-
formance. Second, the negative direct and indirect effect of being enrolled into schools with
a lower mean socioeconomic level, and third, the fact that positive peer effects increase the
higher the mean parental education of the school. Our results showed that some schools were
effective at selecting students with a higher socioeconomic status, thus enabling them, ce-
teris paribus, to outperform other centres. However, student segregation by socioeconomic
status seemed to be especially damaging for students with a low socioeconomic background,
who do not only fare worse at school because their family characteristics and the mean char-
acteristics of their peers, but because, at the same time, the impact of the latter is non-linear.
These results highlight the existence of equity reasons for increasing the control of school
selection –in public and private publicly-funded schools– and studying new ways of allocat-
ing students among schools. This would mitigate the polarising impact of peer effects. In this
respect, the two largest Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona, introduced new student distri-
bution criteria in year 2013, both systems having in common a modification of zoning laws.
These changes could, on the one hand, reduce residence-based segregation –if sufficient in-
formation and economic means are provided to the families– but, on the other, increase
school segregation based on other criteria than residence, especially if school inspection
mechanisms remain slack.
Finally, our results also provided compelling evidence to support the introduction of
mechanisms that correct the mean scores of school rankings which are published in some
Spanish regions per school composition, as part of the achievement premium/disadvantage
of schools being solely explained by school composition effects and student selection.
6. Conclusions
Drawing on PISA 2012 data, this paper investigated the effects of socioeconomic school
composition on Spanish secondary schools. A novel methodology was implemented to
measure the spillovers produced by one specific exogenous characteristic of a student’s
schoolmates. Namely, we treated the (school-average) highest level of education completed
by the parents as a measure of the school’s socioeconomic composition. The proposed
methodology relaxes the implicit constraint –common to any peer effect study– whereby the
contextual element can only affect the average outcome through an intercept shift (i.e. a level
effect).
When accounting for all the changes in the educational production function parameters
generated by an improvement in the school’s socioeconomic composition (level and slope
effects), we found that school composition effects are substantial. More specifically, the re-
sults indicated that the effect of moving from the least-advantaged schools (those in the first
quintile of the school-average parental education) to better endowed schools improved the
mathematics test score in a non-linear way, with the positive effect being particularly pro-
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nounced for pupils from top schools –i.e. those enrolled in schools where most of the par-
ents had completed upper-secondary or tertiary education (fifth quintile of the school-aver-
age parental education).
However, this preliminary evidence should not be understood as being the pure contex-
tual effect of a school’s socioeconomic composition, given that it might be confounded by
the presence of correlated effects. In this paper we explicitly attempted to deal with the en-
dogenous selection process whereby students endowed with higher unobserved abilities are
allocated to better schools (in terms of their socioeconomic composition). This was achieved
by re-sorting students according to a predicted linear score obtained from an ordered probit
model, which estimated the probability of membership of each quintile of school-average
parental education. It is argued that, by proxying school-average parental schooling, students
could be re-sorted in a way that is uncorrelated with unobserved individual characteristics.
When school composition spillovers are re-computed on the basis of this artificial re-sorting,
the evidence is significantly different. Indeed, the average effect school socioeconomic com-
position was reduced once self-selection into schools of better socioeconomic composition
was accounted for. This reduction was mostly produced by the decrease in the effect found
for students in the most advantaged schools (i.e. those in the highest quintile of school-aver-
age parental education), given that their strong test-score differential compared with students
in the least-advantaged schools (i.e. the reference group of students in the first quintile) ap-
peared to be driven by a combination of the endogenous students’ sorting and the pure con-
textual effect of socioeconomic school composition. Nevertheless, our results also highlight-
ed that a general positive effect of school composition on test scores was still present, even
when students’ self-selection based on unobserved abilities was controlled for.
Having said this, it is important to bear in mind the potential pitfalls of this study, which
are linked primarily to the limitations of the database drawn upon. First, it is quite likely that
the reported effects of school composition are a lower bound of the true impact, given that
the limited sampling of students in PISA might cause some attenuation bias in our estimate
(compare Micklewright et al., 2012). Second, in the case where selection is made on the
basis of a school’s unobserved characteristics (i.e., those that are not captured by the exten-
sive list of school controls included here), the measure of school composition effects might
still contain some bias. Third, if the variables used as predictors of school-average parental
education are in some way correlated with unobserved student abilities, the methodology ad-
hered to here for reducing the bias generated by endogenous sorting would not be effective
at all.
Whatever the case, and even taking these potential limitations into consideration, the ev-
idence presented above makes important contributions to the ongoing public debate concern-
ing school laws and the (re)allocation of certain types of student into (other) schools. First
of all, the evidence of positive and significant school composition effects –which even per-
sists when we control for the endogenous sorting of students into schools– highlights that the
well-documented achievement gap between students from different socioeconomic back-
ground is implicitly exacerbated by this contextual effect of school’s socioeconomic compo-
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sition. Moreover, the relevance of endogenous students’ sorting points out that more able
students from less-advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds are unable to obtain the benefi-
cial effect of attending schools with a more favourable socioeconomic composition. This is
especially true for the most advantaged schools, for which the effect of endogenous sorting
appears to be extremely relevant. Finally, the overall results, together with the relevance of
endogenous student sorting raise the question as to just how equitable and efficient the zon-
ing laws regulating access to Spain’s secondary schools are. In fact, the joint effect of the
existing residential segregation according to socioeconomic status and its interaction with
zoning laws are probably the main mechanisms behind endogenous pupils’ sorting, which
should be taken into account by policymakers.
Whatever the case, a more detailed examination of the relationship between school en-
rolment laws, school segregation and the effects of school composition is essential in order
to provide more influential policy recommendations. These represent interesting questions
for future research, particularly if more exhaustive data can be drawn upon.
Annexes
Table A.1.
SCHooL CompoSITIon vARIABLE
School socio-economic composition variable:
School-Average parental years of Education (Highest)
num. obs. mean s.d.
quintile 1 r ( ef. group) 4,964 10.28 0.759
quintile 2 4,948 11.884 0.287
quintile 3 4,947 12.769 0.261
quintile 4 4,948 13.718 0.269
quintile 5 4,934 15.023 0.601
Note: the years of education are based on the OECD’s standard (ISCED97) or levels of completed education; cal-
culations include the final student weight.
Table A.2.
Eq. (7) ESTImATIon RESuLTS
Plausible 
Dependent variable: 
Values for the Mathematics Test Score Coefficient t-Statistic 
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Table A.2. (Continued)
Eq. (7) ESTImATIon RESuLTS
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notes
1. Another parallel discussion concerns the so–called optimal school–mix, which seeks to establish the optimal
school system design for overall and individual school performance in terms socioeconomic segregation/inte-
gration schemes. Willms (2010) or Söderström and Uusitalo (2010), provide interesting insights into the issue.
Entering into this discussion is, however, out of the purposes of this paper, given that it would require a deep
analysis of different counterfactual school–mix policies, which is unfeasible with the available data for the
Spanish reality. 
2. Specifically, what is commonly referred to as reflection problems, which involve the simultaneous determina-
tion of achievement for all students within a peer group (i.e. a simultaneity bias problem).
3. Put in other words, as we explain below, simply including a measure of school composition in the test–score
equation would solely introduce, if any, a change in the intercept of the education production function. How-
ever, changes in the socioeconomic composition at school level could also generate changes in the impact (i.e.
the coefficients) of other inputs of the education production function – such as family and school characteris-
tics, which are neglected in the typical linear–in-mean models of educational spillovers.
4. Sacerdote (2011) provides an updated review on the State of the Art.
5. Other papers in which the identification of peer effects relies on IV strategies include those by Feinstein and
Symons (1999) and Robertson and Symons (2003), where the instruments consist of location variables and
teacher assessment of a student’s previous ability combined with region of birth dummies, respectively.
6. By contrast, they also suggest that the apparent peer effects in mathematics, as estimated by OLS, are due only
to selection effects, given that their fixed-effect estimates are not statistically significant. Additionally, in this
case, peer group heterogeneity seems to play a very limited role in explaining test score attainment.
7. As argued by Micklewright et al. (2012), the limited student sampling made by PISA can result in a measure-
ment error in the estimation of peer effects. This would bias the effect of school composition towards zero.
Unfortunately, such administrative data are not available for public use in the Spanish case; therefore, it should
be borne in mind that the estimates reported in this study represent a lower boundary of the true impact of
school-average parental education.
8. Notice that since the LOGSE reform of 1990, the Spanish secondary education system has been compulsory
and comprehensive until the age of sixteen, which (as in the case of Denmark) makes the school-fixed effect
framework unfeasible for controlling endogenous peer group selection. See Section 3 for details as to how
such a problem is addressed in this paper. 
9. While Raymond and Roig (2011) estimate the externality produced by the average human capital of workers, a
clearly endogenous variable (since completed education is a choice variable and high ability workers might sort
into firms with higher endowment of human capital), we study the impact of mean parental education, which
would be exogenous if students were randomly assigned across schools. In both cases, average schooling (of
individuals or parents, respectively) represents a contextual or composition variable in the unit of analysis (firms
or schools), which can be treated using the novel methodology proposed by the above mentioned authors. 
10. Calero and Escardíbul (2007) or Mancebón et al. (2012) are examples of the application of this strategy to the
Spanish case.
11. As noted by Raymond and Roig (2010), the definition of the reference group is always subject to some degree
of arbitrariness; in their case, they define the reference group as those productive establishments in which the
average workers’ human capital is equal to or less than eight years of schooling. This definition follows the
logic that eight years of education corresponds to the compulsory length of education under the institutional
framework that was then valid for individuals in their sample; moreover, it should represent those firms that
chiefly employ unskilled workers. In our case, we consider it better to define the reference group in an endoge-
nous way – i.e. dividing the sample into quintiles and taking the first one as the reference group. This defini-
tion allows us: (i) to consider schools as being more heterogeneous units than firms; and (ii) to maintain a suf-
ficient number of observations in the reference and non-reference groups. Notice also that we consider school
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socioeconomic composition rather than classroom’s composition because our analysis draws on PISA data,
which does not allow identifying the classroom. However, since the results from this methodology might be
sensitive to the choice of the reference group (we thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion), we also
checked the robustness of results using the fifth quintile of school-average parental education as a reference.
The results appear to be qualitatively unaffected by the alternative choice of the reference group (details are
available upon request).
12. This is because if the education production function for the least-advantaged group is miss-specified, the pro-
posed index would be affected by spurious statistical relationships. Notice that the correct specification in
terms of observable variables can be reasonably assumed because of the large set of student, family and school
controls included in the empirical specification which mainly follows the existing literature based on PISA
data. Moreover, similar results are obtained using a more parsimonious model, confirming the above-men-
tioned assumption. However, miss-specification due to unobservable variables related to non-random stu-
dents’ sorting remains an important issue, which is specifically treated in the next section.
13. The estimates are not reported here for space reasons, but are available upon request. Also the 2SLS model
was estimated using students’ weights. Moreover, the standard errors were clustered at the school level. 
14. Despite this, the 2012 PISA survey also contains information about reading and science skills. Attention is
limited here to the mathematics domain for reasons of space. The results for the other two skills are qualita-
tively similar, and are available upon request from the author.
15. The PISA survey has several statistical peculiarities that must be taken into account in the estimation phase.
First of all, the skills assessment was carried out using five plausible values for each field, which are then nor-
malised to obtain a global average of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. Moreover, the structure of the final
sample must also be taken into account, given that it is the product of a complex two-stage stratification pro-
cedure used to ensure that the entire population is represented. Specifically, the first step consists in the strat-
ified selection of schools with 15- to 16-year-olds enrolled in their classes, with sampling probabilities that are
proportional to the number of eligible students enrolled; in the second step, a given number of students are
randomly selected within each sampled school (up to 35).
16. The final student weight provided in the PISA database has been used in the computation of the school compo-
sition variable. This should reduce the imprecision in the school composition measure obtained from PISA data,
where (as commented above) not all the students from every school are sampled. Notice also that the mean peer
characteristic is usually computed without the contribution of the individual (because this might cause a reflec-
tion problem when the average value of the peer group is used as an explanatory variable). In this case, where
school-average parental education is only used to define reference and non-reference groups, this complication
is not necessary. In any case, the results are virtually unchanged when the average parental education is not
computed using weight and/or does not include the individual’s contribution (the results are available upon re-
quest). See Table 1A in the Annex for more details about the school composition variable.
17. The estimates of the educational production functions for the reference group (eq. 7) are reported in Table 2A
(Annex). 
~18. The ordered probit specification was chosen with the aim of obtaining the estimates linear index (g’R
i
) consis-
tent with the fact that the dependent variable (quintiles of school-average parental education) is defined over the
1–5 interval. This comes at the cost of imposing functional form assumptions (i.e. normality of the latent index’s
error term). However, our results are insensitive to such assumptions, given that the results are robust also when
~equation (6) (and the resulting linear index (g’R ) is estimated using OLS (the results are available upon request).
i
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Resumen
Este artículo analiza, a partir de datos de PISA-2012, el impacto de la composición socio-económica
de los centros sobre los resultados en la competencia científica de los alumnos españoles de educación
secundaria obligatoria. Se adopta una metodología semi-paramétrica que permite captar el impacto
sobre todos los parámetros de la función de producción educativa. Se procura corregir por la endoge-
neidad en la asignación de los alumnos en los centros con mejor composición socio-económica. El
efecto positivo de la composición escolar es más pronunciado cuándo se adopta la metodología semi-
paramétrica, evidenciando la relevancia de los efectos de pendientes que ejerce la composición esco-
lar. Sin embargo, las externalidades se ven reducidas cuando se controla el proceso de selección endó-
geno. 
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